Whose physical presence counts as the company's?
Edvin Givargis Published 10 minute read
The short answer
More people's than a company's own payroll suggests. Since Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960), the Supreme Court has treated a company as physically present in a state through independent contractors acting on its behalf, and the independent-contractor label carries no constitutional weight of its own; what matters is whether the in-state activity helps the company establish or maintain its market there. A 2013 Illinois administrative decision, non-precedential but instructive, extended that logic to income tax nexus by attributing thousands of in-state direct-sales distributors' activities to their out-of-state supplier, and separately held that the supplier's own sales tax registration, maintained and filed against for more than two decades, established income tax nexus by itself. That second holding is the sharper trap: a registration taken as a courtesy or an accommodation can be read back as an admission of nexus, and because the statute of limitations never begins to run against a non-filer, a mismatch between one tax registration and silence on another is precisely the pattern that nexus-discovery efforts are built to find. The same attribution logic reaches entities with no employees of their own, as a California appellate decision involving special-purpose securitization affiliates illustrates, while a separate line of cases holds the doctrine to activity that actually helps build a market, not any vendor relationship that happens to touch the state.
The attribution doctrine: Scripto and Tyler Pipe
Attributional nexus, sometimes called agency nexus, rests on a simple proposition: a company's physical presence in a state is not confined to the people it employs. In Scripto, ten wholesalers working for a Georgia manufacturer solicited orders throughout Florida. The wholesalers were independent contractors under the manufacturer's own characterization, paid on commission, free to represent other companies, and nominally unsupervised in their day-to-day work. The Supreme Court found that irrelevant to the constitutional question. What mattered was that the wholesalers were soliciting sales continuously and doing so for the manufacturer's benefit; the label the parties put on the relationship did not change what was actually happening inside the state. Independent contractors soliciting orders created the same jurisdictional footprint as employees would have.
Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987), reaffirmed and sharpened that holding almost three decades later in a case testing Washington's business and occupation tax against an out-of-state pipe manufacturer whose only in-state activity ran through an independent sales representative. The Court repeated Scripto's core point and endorsed the Washington Supreme Court's formulation of the test: the crucial factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in the state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in the state for sales. That phrase, market-establishing or market-maintaining, has become the working standard for attributional nexus generally, and it explains why the doctrine reaches distributors, sales agents, and other representatives regardless of contract label, so long as their in-state conduct functions to build or protect the company's market rather than merely brushing against the state in passing.
The modern application: an out-of-state supplier's distributors
Scripto and Tyler Pipe arose in the sales and use tax context, where a lower constitutional threshold has historically applied because the legal incidence of the tax falls on the purchaser rather than the collector. A 2013 Illinois administrative decision, Illinois Office of Administrative Hearings, No. IT 13-05 (2013), is notable precisely because it carried the same attribution reasoning into income tax, where no such lower threshold is supposed to apply. The decision is non-precedential and binds no one beyond the parties, but it shows how a state revenue department can extend the doctrine when the facts invite it.
The taxpayer was part of a unitary group whose parent operated a network-marketing business, selling products through a network of independent distributors rather than retail stores. Thousands of the parent's distributors operated in Illinois, generally selling in private homes or other non-traditional settings rather than storefronts. The administrative law judge found several features of that relationship sufficient to attribute the distributors' Illinois presence to the out-of-state supplier: the supplier had contracted with far more distributors than the ten wholesalers the Supreme Court found sufficient in Scripto; distributors earned bonuses tied to their sales performance, giving the supplier a direct financial stake in what happened in the state; distributors were required to follow a set of rules the supplier imposed; and distributors acted as the supplier's agent for purposes of fulfilling the supplier's money-back guarantee to retail purchasers, accepting returns, providing replacement product, and issuing refunds on the supplier's behalf. Because distributors accepted and delivered orders locally, without sending them outside Illinois for approval, and because guarantee fulfillment went well beyond mere solicitation, the administrative law judge also concluded that the distributors' activity exceeded the protection Public Law 86-272 affords to solicitation of orders for tangible personal property, a limit the companion article on sales-representative activities under P.L. 86-272 examines in more detail.
The registration trap
The distributor-attribution holding is the more conventional part of the decision. The sharper point, and the one worth building a compliance habit around, is what the administrative law judge did with the supplier's own conduct. For more than twenty years, the supplier had registered with the Illinois Department of Revenue and filed sales tax returns, collecting and remitting tax on distributors' purchases of product for resale. The supplier argued that this registration was a voluntary accommodation, undertaken at its own initiative to simplify collection on behalf of its distributors rather than any admission that it did business in Illinois. The administrative law judge rejected that framing outright, holding that the supplier had, in the judge's words, submitted itself to the taxing and regulatory authority of Illinois when it registered with the department and agreed to file Illinois returns, and that it was much too late, after two decades of filing, to complain that it lacked minimum contacts with the state.
The lesson generalizes well beyond direct-sales suppliers. Registrations taken purely as a convenience, collecting use tax as a courtesy to customers, registering to hold a resale certificate, filing in a state to obtain a benefit unrelated to any belief that a filing obligation exists, can be recast by an examiner as evidence that the company itself concluded it had nexus. Because the reasoning does not distinguish between a registration entered for tax-liability reasons and one entered for convenience, the safer posture treats every registration decision as a nexus decision, not a separable administrative convenience. The asymmetry that makes this dangerous is procedural rather than substantive: a company that registers and later disputes liability is arguing against its own filing history, while a company that never registers at all faces no limitations period whatsoever, since the statute of limitations on assessment does not begin to run against a return that was never filed. A company registered for sales tax but silent on income tax, or registered to withhold on payroll but silent on where its independent sales force operates, presents exactly the mismatch that state discovery units are built to query, comparing one tax type's registration roll against another's and asking why a company visibly present for one purpose reports nothing for the rest. Companies using leased or co-employed staff face a related but distinct version of the same registration-consistency question, addressed in the companion article on PEO arrangements and payroll factor exposure.
Where the line sits: no employees, and two different constitutional tests
Attribution does not require that a company have employees at all. Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board, 237 Cal. App. 4th 193 (2015), tested the doctrine against two special-purpose entities formed solely to hold securitized loan pools, entities with no property and no employees of their own anywhere. The court found that the entities were nonetheless doing business in California because an affiliated finance company acted as their agent: the affiliate's officers and directors overlapped with the entities' own, the affiliate selected which loans to securitize, administered sales of the resulting securities, and undertook collection activity on the entities' behalf, including physical visits to a California auction house tied to the value of the collateral securing the loans. An entity that owns nothing and employs no one in a state can still be found present there through an agent's conduct, provided that conduct is significantly connected to the entity's own business rather than merely incidental to it.
Attribution has limits, and the same body of case law that expands nexus also polices its edges. A vendor relationship alone, without evidence that the in-state party's activity actually helps establish or maintain the company's market, does not satisfy the standard; a manufacturer that sells to an in-state retailer and offers ordinary trade terms, volume incentives, or merchandising guidance is not automatically present through the retailer's own operations. The administrative decisions that stretch furthest also tend to blur a distinction the Supreme Court has kept sharp elsewhere: due process asks only whether a company had fair notice that a state might tax it, a standard satisfied by comparatively thin contacts, while the Commerce Clause independently requires a substantial nexus, a standard the Court in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), described as serving a different purpose, limiting the burden state taxation places on interstate commerce rather than protecting any individual taxpayer's notice interest. An administrative decision that reasons almost entirely in due-process terms, purposeful direction and fair warning, while treating the result as satisfying both constitutional tests, has not actually done the Commerce Clause analysis a reviewing court would require.
Practice notes
A contacts review built around this doctrine looks past the org chart to the functional relationships a company has with anyone acting on its behalf in a state: distributors, sales agents, service technicians, affiliated entities sharing officers or staff, and any independent contractor whose work is significantly associated with building or protecting the company's market there, whether or not the company's own payroll ever crosses the state line. It also looks at registration history across tax types side by side, sales tax, income tax, withholding, gross receipts, because a mismatch between what a company files and what its own facts would justify is the pattern most likely to draw scrutiny, and because an accommodation registration entered without that comparison can end up doing more nexus work than intended. Entities with no direct employees deserve the same review as those with large ones; the question is not whether the entity has staff but whether anyone, employee, contractor, or affiliate, is acting on its behalf inside the state, a question that also arises for disregarded single-member entities whose activities land on an owner, discussed in the companion article on disregarded SMLLC owner nexus. None of this substitutes for a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction review of the actual relationships in place; it identifies where that review needs to start. A contacts review of this kind sits at the center of the state tax nexus consulting G&G State Tax Group provides, because attribution questions turn on relationships a standard questionnaire never asks about.
This article states the law as of September 18, 2026
Statutes, rates, thresholds, and agency practice change, and a different set of facts can change the answer. Before acting on anything discussed above, contact G&G State Tax Group to confirm what has changed since this was written and how the rules apply to a specific situation.
G&G State Tax Group, LLC is a state and local tax advisory firm. The firm provides state and local tax consulting and representation in state and local tax controversies. G&G does not prepare or file tax returns, perform attest services, or provide bookkeeping, and is not a CPA firm.