Does spending more than six months, or more than nine, in California make someone a resident?

Two time rules from two different sources

The two figures come from different places and do different work. The nine-month rule is statutory and shifts the evidentiary starting point against the taxpayer, and the FTB's manual describes its limit: "Note that R&TC Section 17016 merely provides a presumption of residence. The presumption can be overcome" (RSTM 2400). The regulation adds the converse: spending less than nine months creates no presumption of nonresidence, and a person may be a resident without being in the state at all during the year (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, section 17016; RSTM 2400).

The six-month rule is regulatory, and it works in the taxpayer's favor: when its conditions are met, the regulation supplies the conclusion that the presence is temporary or transitory (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, section 17014, subd. (b)). Both rules sit on top of the definition that decides every case, under which a resident is every individual in California for other than a temporary or transitory purpose and every California domiciliary who is outside the state for a temporary or transitory purpose (Rev. and Tax. Code section 17014, subd. (a); RSTM 2100).

The FTB's guide for individuals states only the nine-month presumption (FTB Publication 1031 (2025), section H) and lists time spent in California against time spent elsewhere as one residency factor among many (section G). It does not describe the seasonal visitor rule, which lives in the regulation and the manual.

The seasonal visitor rule, condition by condition

The regulation's protection has four conditions.

Domicile outside California. The rule applies only to an individual "domiciled without the state" (RSTM 2300). A taxpayer who was a California domiciliary must first establish a change of domicile, and the party asserting a change of domicile bears the burden of proving it (RSTM 2500). In Appeal of Berner, 2001-SBE-006-A (opinion on rehearing, Aug. 1, 2002), long-time California domiciliaries who had acquired Nevada homes first had to establish a change of domicile to Nevada for each year in issue; only then did the Board of Equalization find that their presence in California did not exceed six months in any taxable year and that their activity here was that of a seasonal visitor.

A permanent abode at the place of domicile. The regulation requires that the individual maintain a permanent abode at the place of domicile (RSTM 2300). In the Klemp litigation, an Illinois couple who wintered in a California desert home had given up their Illinois apartment and stayed in apartment-hotels and with friends when in Illinois (Appeal of Klemp, 1970-SBE-043). The Board of Equalization held them residents, but the Court of Appeal treated them as seasonal visitors (Klemp v. Franchise Tax Board (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 870), reasoning, as the Board of Equalization later quoted it, that the lack of an empty house or apartment in Illinois "is a factor to be considered," but that "the decision must turn upon what they were doing in California" (Appeal of Dreiling, 1989-SBE-032). The missing abode removes the regulation's protection; it does not by itself make the visitor a resident.

Presence not exceeding an aggregate of six months within the taxable year. The count is aggregate, so separate visits are added together, and it runs within the taxable year, not across a season.

No activity other than that of a seasonal visitor, tourist or guest. The regulation then lists connections that do not, by themselves, cost visitor status: owning or maintaining a home in California, opening a bank account for paying personal expenses, and having membership in local social clubs (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, section 17014, subd. (b); RSTM 2300). The FTB's manual illustrates the point with a retired North Dakota couple who keep their home there, spend four months a year in California, own a California home, keep a California checking account and belong to a country club, but conduct no business here; the manual concludes they are nonresidents (RSTM 2300, Example 1). In Berner, a California home and golf club membership did not change the result.

Consider a retiree domiciled in Washington who keeps her Spokane house and spends mid-November to early April each year in a Palm Desert condominium she owns, paying expenses from a local checking account and playing at a local club. She sits inside the regulation. Three changes take her out. If she accepts a paid board seat with a California company and attends its meetings in person, her conduct is no longer only that of a visitor. If she sells the Spokane house and rents a room when she goes north, the permanent-abode condition fails. And if a surgery and recovery keep her in Palm Desert through July, her presence for that taxable year exceeds six months. In each case she has not become a resident; she has moved into the general facts-and-circumstances test, which has protected winter visitors before. In Appeal of Walker (Estate of Bell), 1963-SBE-142, an Illinois domiciliary who averaged about five and three-quarter months a year in California was held a nonresident because "[s]he came here to spend the winter, a purpose that was neither indefinite or relatively long." It has also gone the other way. In Appeal of Jones, 1972-SBE-033, a couple who kept Texas voter registration, licenses and a homestead, but owned a Long Beach home, had close relatives nearby and received medical treatment here were held residents for a year in which they spent eight months in California, and their residency continued into later years, including one in which they spent about five months here.

The nine-month presumption, and how it is overcome

The presumption is rebutted by satisfactory evidence that the presence is for a temporary or transitory purpose (Rev. and Tax. Code section 17016; RSTM 2400). The FTB's guide treats a vacation, a stay to complete a transaction, or passing through as temporary or transitory, and an assignment to a California office for a long or indefinite period, retirement here with no specific plans to leave, or an indefinite recuperation as not (FTB Publication 1031 (2025), section H).

The leading illustration is a stay that ran long for reasons outside the taxpayer's control. In Appeal of Woolley, 1951-SBE-005, an actor who kept his home and business headquarters in New York came to California for a film, signed on for a second picture, and then stayed while a studio labor strike delayed the production and an illness kept him under a doctor's care. He lived in a hotel on a weekly basis. For 1945 the Franchise Tax Commissioner "was aided by a presumption of California residence," but the Board of Equalization held that the stay was for a temporary or transitory purpose, finding that neither delay "was the result of any change in his intention to remain here." The FTB's manual cites the decision for the proposition that the presumption can be overcome (RSTM 2400). The contrast is Appeal of Ghali, 1971-SBE-037: a foreign official who lived in California for more than 16 years, restricted in leaving the country, was a resident, because "[a]ny floating intention to return some day" to his home country did not rebut the presumption and his restrictions did not defeat residency. Appeal of Currier, 1969-SBE-002, applied the presumption to a family transferred to California for an assignment of indefinite length, with children in local schools, holding that "[i]n order to prevail, appellants must prove" that their presence was nevertheless for a temporary or transitory purpose.

Consider an executive domiciled in Singapore, with a family home there, who comes to California in early February for a four-month systems integration project. The project slips, a medical procedure follows, and the executive leaves in late November. The presumption applies for that year. The record that rebuts it looks like Woolley's: a defined assignment with an end date, short-term housing, the family and home kept abroad, each delay documented as it arose, and departure once the obstacle cleared. The record that does not looks like Currier's: an open-ended role, a California lease, and a family that joins. The seasonal visitor rule was never available, because work is activity beyond that of a visitor; even at five months the general test would have decided the case.

Between six and nine months: who carries the burden

A nondomiciliary present more than six but not more than nine months in a taxable year, and a nondomiciliary under six months who fails a condition of the regulation, faces neither rule. The Board of Equalization stated the consequence in Jones: eight months "will not raise the presumption of residence found in section 17016," but the taxpayers' "argument that a presumption of nonresidency arises for a period of less than 9 months" was rejected (Appeal of Jones, 1972-SBE-033). The question is decided on the whole record, under the theory that a person is a resident of the place of closest connections (FTB Publication 1031 (2025), section G).

The burden in that range does not shift to the FTB because the taxpayer is domiciled elsewhere. Before the Office of Tax Appeals, the appellant bears the burden of proof on all issues of fact, except as otherwise provided by law, by a preponderance of the evidence (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, section 30219, subds. (a), (b)), and the Board of Equalization applied the same rule in residency appeals: the FTB's determination "is presumed correct and appellant has the burden of proving it to be wrong" (Appeal of Berner, 2001-SBE-006-A). The FTB carries the burden on one issue: where it asserts that a taxpayer changed domicile into California, the party asserting the change must prove it, and if doubt remains, domicile is found not to have changed (Appeal of Beckwith, 2022-OTA-332P; RSTM 2500). For a nondomiciliary, that rule protects the domicile, not the residency position, because the residency definition reaches every individual in California for other than a temporary or transitory purpose (Rev. and Tax. Code section 17014, subd. (a); RSTM 2100). A person "may be a resident of California for income tax purposes although he is not domiciled here": the Currier taxpayers' evidence tended to prove an Arizona domicile but did not rebut the presumption (Appeal of Currier, 1969-SBE-002). Jones shows the further consequence: once residency was established in one year, it continued, and the burden was on the taxpayers to show that later absences were for other than a temporary purpose.

The California domiciliary: why neither rule helps

For a California domiciliary, the time rules offer almost nothing apart from the 546-day employment-contract rule, the subject of the library's article on work assignments outside California. The seasonal visitor rule is limited by its terms to individuals domiciled outside the state (RSTM 2300), and the Board of Equalization called the Klemp line of reasoning "entirely inapplicable to California domiciliaries unless they are trying to claim out-of-state residency by virtue of seasonal visits to another state" (Appeal of Dreiling, 1989-SBE-032). A domiciliary who is outside California for a temporary or transitory purpose remains a resident (Rev. and Tax. Code section 17014, subd. (a)), whatever the day count, and the regulation confirms that a person may be a resident without spending any part of the year in the state (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, section 17016; Appeal of Smoot, 2021-OTA-041 (nonprecedential), quoting the regulation).

Consider a management consultant domiciled in San Diego, who owns a home there and spends about 120 days a year in California between engagements in other states and abroad. Spending far less than nine months in California does not help, because no presumption of nonresidence arises. Spending more than six months elsewhere does not help either, because the seasonal visitor rule protects only nondomiciliaries present in California and has no counterpart for a California domiciliary's travels outward. The consultant is a resident unless a change of domicile can be proven or the absences are for other than a temporary or transitory purpose, and in either case the burden is the consultant's (RSTM 2500; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, section 30219, subd. (a)). The library's article on how the FTB evaluates a claimed change of residency covers that route.

Counting the months

Both rules count time, not days, and neither the statute, the regulation, the FTB's manual sections on these rules, nor Publication 1031 states how a partial day or a travel day is counted (RSTM 2300, 2400; FTB Publication 1031 (2025), sections G and H). Three features of the text are settled. The count is aggregate, so separate visits are added together. It is measured within the taxable year: in Woolley, the Board of Equalization observed that a hypothetical stay of about nine months would not have raised the presumption "as the period was not within a single taxable year" (Appeal of Woolley, 1951-SBE-005). For a winter visitor with a steady pattern, a season split across December 31 does not lower the annual total, but the split matters in the first and last years of a pattern and for a single long stay. And the count is a reconstruction: the FTB may approximate physical presence from the location shown in financial records, and its calendar in one precedential appeal assigned days in fractions (Appeal of Beckwith, 2022-OTA-332P), a process the library's article on how days are counted in a California residency audit covers in detail.

New York shows what California does not do. There, an individual not domiciled in New York who maintains a permanent place of abode in the state and spends in the aggregate more than 183 days of the taxable year there is a resident by force of statute, whether or not domiciled in the state (Tax Law section 605(b)(1)(B)), and presence for any part of a calendar day generally counts as a day in New York (TSB-A-11(8)I (Oct. 12, 2011), citing 20 NYCRR 105.20(c)). The count is the test, and purpose does not rescue a day over the line. California's figures either shift the starting point or supply a conclusion that depends on conditions beyond the count, and the purpose of the presence remains the question.

Practice notes

For a nondomiciliary relying on the six-month rule, all four conditions are tracked, not only the count: the out-of-state domicile, a permanent abode at the domicile that stays available and in use, a running tally of California presence for each taxable year with partial days counted as California days, and an inventory of California activities that excludes paid work, board service and business management. A planned California stay that will cross six months is evaluated before it happens, because past that line the case moves to the closest-connections test, where a California home, family nearby and medical care can tip the result, as they did in Jones. When a stay approaches nine months for reasons outside the taxpayer's control, the reasons, the original plan and the steps taken to leave are documented as they occur, since that contemporaneous record is what rebutted the presumption in Woolley. A California domiciliary who travels most of the year has no six-month or nine-month rule to rely on; unless the 546-day employment-contract rule applies (Rev. and Tax. Code section 17014, subd. (d)), planning turns on a change of domicile or an absence for other than a temporary or transitory purpose, with the burden on the taxpayer. G&G State Tax Group provides California residency planning and residency audit representation alongside its state and local tax practice.